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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 950057-CA 
v. : Priority No. 2 
JASON SCOTT WILLIAMS, : Oral Argument Requested 
Defendant-Appellant.: 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OP PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Jason Scott Williams (a/k/a Scott 
Wilkerson) appeals his conviction for attempted theft by 
receiving, a third degree felony under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-
102(3), 76-6-408, 76-6-412 (1) (a) (ii) (1995). The conviction was 
entered in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Utah, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding. 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
AND 
STANDARD OP REVIEW 
This case presents but a single dispositive issue, 
corresponding to Point II of Williams' Brief of Appellant, as 
follows: 
I double jeopardy principles allow Williams' 
circuit court-entered misdemeanor firearms convictions, plus his 
subsequent district court-entered felony theft conviction, given 
•^session of the same stolen 
firearm? To the extent necessary, Williams' challenge to the 
trial court's fact findings, in Point I of his brief, will be 
addressed within the State's argument on the above-identified 
issue. The State agrees that Williams' double jeopardy argument 
presents a question of law, on which no deference is due to the 
trial court. See, e.g., Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 
P.2d 467, 460 (Utah 1989); State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469, 471 
(Utah App. 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The federal "double jeopardy" prohibition, U.S. CONST. 
AMEND. V, states: "nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb[.]" Utah's 
parallel provision, UTAH CONST. ART. I § 12, similarly states, "nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." 
Utah's pertinent double jeopardy statutes, Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-
1-6(2) (a), 76-1-401, 76-1-402, 76-3-401 (1995), are copied in the 
appendix to this brief, as is rule 9.5, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Williams was charged with theft by receiving stolen 
property--specifically, a firearm--a second degree felony, and 
with carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, a class A misdemeanor 
(R. 08-09) . The concealed weapon charge was dismissed at 
preliminary hearing (R. 04). Williams moved to dismiss the theft 
charge on state double jeopardy grounds; that motion was denied 
(R. 138-39, 171). Williams then entered a conditional guilty 
plea to attempted theft by receiving, a third degree felony. 
Williams reserved, under Utah R. Crim. P. 11 (i) and State v. 
2 
Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), the right to pursue his 
double jeopardy argument on appeal (R. 91, 172-73). Williams was 
given a suspended zero-to-five year sentence, and placed on 
probation (R. 99-100). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Williams was found in the vicinity of an apparent 
gang-related "shots fired" disturbance in Salt Lake City. An 
officer responding to the disturbance discovered a loaded, sawed-
off shotgun in plain view in an automobile driven by Williams. A 
subsequent search of the vehicle revealed a loaded pistol hidden 
beneath the vehicle's floormat. Williams told the officer that 
the pistol was "probably stolen" (R. 136-37). 
Based upon those discoveries, Williams was arrested. 
The Salt Lake City Attorney charged him with two counts of 
carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle, and one count of carrying 
a concealed dangerous weapon--all misdemeanors under the 
applicable city ordinances (R. 10). Two days after his arrest, 
Williams pleaded guilty, in circuit court, to the concealed 
weapon charge and to one of the loaded firearm charges. The 
second loaded firearm charge was dismissed (R. 203). 
The day following Williams' guilty pleas on the city 
charges, the Salt Lake County Attorney (now Salt Lake District 
Attorney), having confirmed that the pistol found in Williams' 
car was stolen, charged Williams with theft by receiving stolen 
property, a second degree felony because the stolen property was 
a firearm (R. 08). The county attorney also charged Williams 
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with carrying a concealed dangerous weapon. The latter charge 
was dismissed at preliminary hearing, evidently because Williams 
had resolved it by his guilty plea in the earlier, city 
prosecution (R. 09, 84, 175). 
Williams was bound over to district court on the 
theft by receiving charge (R. 02-04). In the district court, 
Williams moved to dismiss that charge as well (R. 25). Williams 
argued that he could only be prosecuted in a single proceeding 
for all of the offenses that had prompted his arrest. Because 
one such proceeding had already been concluded in the circuit 
court, argued Williams, state double jeopardy principles barred 
his subsequent prosecution in the district court (R. 25-27) . The 
district court, upon entry of amended findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, denied the motion to dismiss (R. 136-39). On 
appeal, Williams renews his double jeopardy argument. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Because Williams concedes that his "successive 
prosecution" for theft by receiving was permissible under federal 
double jeopardy principles, the question before this Court is 
whether any state law affords him broader double jeopardy 
protection. Williams mounts no persuasive argument for such 
protection: under Utah Supreme Court precedent, federal double 
jeopardy principles also govern state double jeopardy analysis. 
Further, adoption of Williams' position--which depends upon a 
repudiated federal view--would create the very legal confusion 
that Williams decries. 
4 
Also under settled Utah law, the theft charge and the 
firearms charges against Williams stemmed from separate criminal 
episodes. Therefore, statutory and rule provisions relied upon 
by Williams, which limit the prosecution of separate offenses 
committed during a single episode, cannot provide the relief 
Williams seeks from his conviction for attempted theft by 
receiving. Finally, even if this Court adopts Williams' legal 
theory of double jeopardy, Williams' conviction should not be 
reversed. Instead, an evidentiary remand should be granted, 
allowing the State to introduce competent evidence in accord with 
the new double jeopardy rule advocated by Williams. 
ARGUMENT 
WILLIAMS WAS PROPERLY PROSECUTED FOR 
THEFT BY RECEIVING, EVEN THOUGH HE HAD 
ALREADY PLEADED GUILTY TO OTHER CHARGES 
INVOLVING THE SAME STOLEN FIREARM 
Williams concedes that his "successive prosecution" 
for theft by receiving was permissible under federal double 
jeopardy principles. See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 125, 
113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993). In Dixon, the United States Supreme 
Court held that the venerable "same elements" test of Blockburger 
v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), governs when the 
government may successively prosecute a person who has already 
faced charges arising from one course of unlawful conduct. 
Accordingly, the Court overruled its prior holding, in Grady v. 
Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), that had more tightly limited the 
government's ability to bring a successive prosecution. 
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Because the concealed weapon, loaded weapon, and 
theft by receiving crimes each contain one or more elements that 
are not elements of the other crimes, Williams correctly 
recognizes that there was no federal bar to his subsequent 
prosecution on the theft by receiving charge (Br. of Appellant at 
24) . To put the matter more squarely under Blockburger: theft 
by receiving is a separate offense, neither encompassing nor 
included within the firearms offenses. See Blockburger, 284 U.S. 
at 304 (fl[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a 
violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be 
applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, 
is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the 
other does not"). Therefore, Williams was properly prosecuted 
for theft by receiving, -even though that prosecution was 
initiated after the firearms offenses were adjudicated. 
Given Williams' appropriate concession under federal 
double jeopardy law, the only question before this Court is 
whether any state law affords him broader "subsequent 
prosecution" protection against the theft prosecution. Williams 
argues that he is entitled to such broader protection under the 
Utah Constitution, Utah statutes, and under a Utah procedural 
rule. This Court should reject Williams' arguments. 
As explained in Points A through C of this brief, 
Williams' arguments fail even if he is correct in his factual 
contention (Br. of Appellant at 10-13) that county prosecutors 
had evidence to prosecute him for theft by receiving at the time 
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his firearms offenses were adjudicated in the city prosecution. 
Only if this Court disagrees with the State's analysis in Points 
A through C need it address the district court factual error 
alleged by Williams; that alleged error is discussed in Point D. 
A. Core State Double Jeopardy Principles are 
Construed in Conformity with Federal Law, and 
therefore Permit Williams' Theft Prosecution. 
Similar to the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, article I § 12 of the Utah Constitution provides, 
"nor shall any person be twice be put in jeopardy for the same 
offense." A Utah statute, Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(2) (a) (1995) 
proscribes double jeopardy in near-identical terms. In McNair v. 
Hayward, 666 P.2d 321 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court 
reviewed a double jeopardy claim under all three of these 
provisions. The court held: "On the basis of the reported 
cases, we conclude that all of these guarantees have the same 
content." Id. at 323. 
Given McNair, Williams cannot claim expanded double 
jeopardy protection under the Utah Constitution, nor under 
section 77-1-6(2) (a). This Court is bound by the Utah Supreme 
Court's explicit pronouncement that these core state protections 
are construed identically with their federal counterpart. State 
v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398-99 & n.3 (Utah 1994), cert, denied, 
U.S. , 115 S. Ct. 910 (1995); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 
1256, 1269 (Utah 1993) (both explaining application of stare 
decisis to intermediate appellate courts). Additionally, the 
Utah Supreme Court has consistently approved and applied the 
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Blockburger double jeopardy analysis. See, e.g., State v. 
McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235-36 (Utah 1990); State v. Franklin, 
735 P.2d 34, 35-36 (Utah 1987); State v. Sosa, 598 P.2d 342, 345-
46 (Utah 1979). Because Williams' successive prosecution was 
permissible under federal standards, it was also permissible 
under core Utah double jeopardy principles. 
Even if this Court were not bound by McNair, 
Williams' bid for expansive state double jeopardy protection is 
unpersuasive. His conclusory assertion that the Blockburger 
"same elements" test is "confusing and unprincipled" (Br. of 
Appellant at 25) is inaccurate. Quite the contrary, as the 
federal Supreme Court observed in Dixon, it was the ruling in 
Grady v. Corbin--which Williams would have this Court adopt as a 
matter of state constitutional law (Br. of Appellant at 28)--that 
was "wrong in principle . . . and unstable in application." 
Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2863; id. at 2860-64 (explaining reasons for 
overruling Grady). Utah courts ought not adopt a constitutional 
rule that has already been tried and found wanting. Cf. State v. 
Scott, 860 P.2d 1005, 1007 n.3 (Utah App. 1993) (rejecting 
similar bid to adopt federal Supreme Court minority view as 
governing state constitutional search and seizure law). 
B. Utah's "Single Criminal Episode11 Statute Does 
Not Apply to this Case; Even if Applicable/ 
the Statute Should be Construed to Conform 
with Federal Double Jeopardy Law. 
Williams also invokes Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 
(1995), which delineates situations when a person may be 
prosecuted for separate offenses committed during a "single 
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criminal episode." In essence, section 76-1-402 permits such 
prosecutions, utilizing a Blockburger "same elements" test, in 
subsection 76-1-402(3) (a), to determine when the offenses are 
separate. For two reasons, section 76-1-402 does not assist 
Williams. 
1. Separate Criminal Episodes. 
First, Williams' reliance on section 76-1-402 is 
misplaced, because he inaccurately asserts that his firearms 
offenses and the subsequently-prosecuted theft offense were 
committed during a single criminal episode (Br. of Appellant at 
14-18). The code provision immediately preceding section 76-1-
402 defines "single criminal episode" as "all conduct which is 
closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or 
accomplishment of a single criminal objective." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-1-401 (1995) (emphasis added). 
Construing section 76-1-401, the Utah Supreme Court 
found no single objective, and therefore no single criminal 
episode, in a case where the defendant first stole a police 
officer's revolver, and then took some hitchhikers hostage during 
the ensuing police pursuit. State v. Ireland, 570 P.2d 1206, 
1207 (Utah 1977). Subsequent cases have been in accord. Stee, 
e.g., Hupp v. Johnson, 606 P.2d 253, 254 (Utah 1980) (separate 
criminal episodes existed where the defendant was caught driving 
drunk, and also was driving without a license, registration, or 
safety inspection); State v. Cornish, 571 P.2d 577, 577-78 (Utah 
1977) (per curiam) (car theft and subsequent failure to stop at 
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police officer's command, were separate criminal episodes). 
Compare State v. Gerwonto, 868 P.2d 50, 59 (Utah 1993) (forgery 
and murder shared single objective, i.e., "to obtain property of 
value from" the victim). 
Based upon the foregoing authority, it is clear that 
Williams did not receive the stolen pistol and then commit the 
firearms offenses in order to accomplish a single objective. The 
objective of receiving the stolen pistol, as for any theft, was 
merely to unlawfully acquire the property of another. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-408(1) (1995). Williams' objectives in secreting the 
pistol, loaded, in an automobile--whatever they may be--are 
separate and unrelated to the objective of theft. 
And it is highly significant that in Cornish and 
Ireland, the Utah Supreme Court held that thefts, even though 
"closely related in time" to an ensuing sequence of criminal 
behavior (in fact, precipitating such behavior), were 
nevertheless separate criminal episodes. As a matter of logic, 
and consistent with those holdings, Williams had to receive the 
stolen weapon--thereby completing the crime of theft by 
receiving--before he could hide it, loaded, in his automobile. 
See Cornish, 571 P.2d at 578 (theft "was a completed offense at 
the time the car was taken"). Accordingly, even if construed 
differently from settled double jeopardy law, Utah's "single 
criminal episode" statute does not apply to Williams' "successive 
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prosecution" claim, because Williams was prosecuted for separate 
criminal episodes.1 
2. Parallel Double Jeopardy Analysis. 
Second, even if section 76-1-402 might apply, that 
statute should be construed in accord with federal double 
jeopardy law. In McNair, discussed earlier, the Utah Supreme 
Court did not specifically address section 76-1-402. However, 
because the court did hold that core federal and state double 
jeopardy principles are to be construed in like fashion, and 
because the court has repeatedly endorsed the Blockburger double 
jeopardy analysis, it seems safe to infer that section 76-1-402, 
which incorporates the Blockburger "same elements" principle, 
must also be construed to conform with federal law. Therefore, 
because Williams' successive prosecution was proper under federal 
law, it was also proper under section 76-1-402. 
C. The Criminal Procedure Rule Relied Upon by 
Williams Does Not Apply to this Case, Because 
Williams Was Prosecuted for Separate Criminal 
Episodes. 
In a final argument, Williams argues that rule 9.5, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, mandated his prosecution in a 
single proceeding for theft by receiving and the firearms 
offenses (Br. of Appellant at 19-22). Rule 9.5 states: 
Williams contends that the conduct or "act" for which he was 
prosecuted was the police officer's discovery of the firearms and 
Williams' admission that the pistol was "probably stolen" (Br. of 
Appellant at 16: "The only 'act' at issue is the discovery of the 
.357 revolver and the defendant's admission"). Not so. Williams 
was prosecuted for his conduct, not the police officer's 
discoveries. 
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(1)(a) Unless otherwise provided by law, 
complaints, citations, or informations 
charging multiple offenses, which may include 
violations of state laws, county ordinances, 
or municipal ordinances and arising from a 
single criminal episode as defined by Section 
76-1-401, shall be filed in a single court 
that has jurisdiction of the charged offense 
with the highest possible penalty of all the 
offenses charged. 
(b) The offenses within the complaint, 
citation, or information may not be separated 
except by order of the court and for good 
cause shown. 
(2) For purposes of this section, the court 
that is adjudicating the complaint, citation, 
or information has jurisdiction over all the 
offenses charged, and a single prosecutorial 
entity shall prosecute the offenses. 
As the emphasized "single criminal episode" language indicates, 
rule 9.5 applies only to offenses committed during a single 
criminal episode. As already explained, reference to Utah 
Supreme Court case law conclusively demonstrates that Williams' 
receipt of the stolen pistol was a separate criminal episode from 
the firearms offenses that he then committed with the pistol. 
Therefore, by its terms, rule 9.5 did not require that Williams 
be prosecuted in one proceeding for all those offenses.2 
2Williams tries to improperly graft jurisdiction rules into 
double jeopardy law (Br. of Appellant at 19-22). If a 
jurisdictional problem exists, the proper remedy would be to hold 
void the convictions entered in the court that lacked jurisdiction. 
See, e.g., Van Der Stappen v. Van Der Stappen, 815 P.2d 1335, 1337 
(Utah App. 1991) (judgment by court that lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction is void). In Williams' case, this would void the 
misdemeanor convictions entered in circuit court, thereby allowing 
the district court, which has jurisdiction over the felony theft by 
receiving charge, to assume jurisdiction over all the charges. Cf. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 9.5(a) (charges arising from a single criminal 
episode are to be prosecuted the court having jurisdiction over the 
most serious offense). 
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D. Because Williams' Legal Arguments Fail Even 
Under His Version of the Facts, the Question 
Whether the Trial Court's Fact Findings Were 
Erroneous is Moot; If Not Moot, the Findings 
Should Either be Upheld, or an Evidentiary 
Remand Ordered. 
The preceding points control this case even if, as 
Williams contends, Salt Lake County prosecutors had evidence to 
prosecute the theft by receiving offense at the time he pled 
guilty to the city-prosecuted firearms offenses (Br. of Appellant 
at 10-13). To reiterate: there was no constitutional, 
statutory, or rule-based bar to Williams' successive prosecution 
for those separate offenses, which were committed during separate 
criminal episodes. Therefore, this Court need not address 
Williams' argument that the district court clearly erred when, in 
denying his motion to dismiss, it found that county prosecutors 
did not know of the theft when Williams pled guilty to the 
firearms offenses (R. 137 HH 2, 6, 7). The question is moot. 
The accuracy of the district court's findings becomes 
a viable issue only if this Court disagrees with the double 
jeopardy analysis set forth in the preceding points. In that 
event, this Court should first observe that Williams could not be 
prosecuted for theft by receiving based solely upon his 
admission, to the arresting officer, that the pistol was 
"probably stolen." The "corpus delicti" rule prohibits 
conviction based solely on an accused's admission, without 
independent evidence that a crime has been committed. See, e.g., 
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State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1162-63 (Utah 1991).3 
Therefore, Williams could not be prosecuted for theft by 
receiving until the theft was independently confirmed. If 
prosecutors did not receive that confirmation until after the 
firearms charges were resolved, the subsequent theft prosecution 
was proper even under Williams' double jeopardy theory. 
Under those circumstances, this Court should either 
affirm the district court's fact findings, or remand the case for 
an evidentiary hearing to determine precisely when independent 
confirmation of the pistol theft was received. Affirmance is 
proper because Williams-has not included, in the record on 
appeal, a transcript of his preliminary hearing on the theft 
charge. That transcript surely sheds light on when prosecutors 
confirmed that the pistol was stolen. For failure to provide 
that transcript, Williams cannot show clear error in the district 
court's finding on this issue. See, e.g., State v. Rawlings, 82-9 
P.2d 150, (Utah App. 1992) (absent adequate record, appellate 
court presumes correctness of trial court rulings). 
But if affirmance is not possible, an evidentiary 
remand, rather than reversal of the district court's finding, is 
appropriate. The specificity of the prosecutor's effort to 
supplement the record with his version of when the pistol theft 
was confirmed strongly indicates that competent evidence on this 
3The corpus delicti rule so operates by barring admission of 
the accused's confession absent the independent corroboration. 
Thus Williams' confession that the pistol was "probably stolen" 
would be inadmissible until prosecutors independently confirmed the 
theft. 
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question is available. A remand to take that evidence, rather 
than reversal of the present findings, would be particularly-
appropriate given that acceptance of Williams' legal theory of 
double jeopardy would create a new rule of law, which the 
prosecutor could not have anticipated during the trial court 
proceedings.4 "[N]either the Double Jeopardy Clause nor any 
other constitutional provision exists to provide unjustified 
windfalls." Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 387 (1989). If this 
Court adopts Williams' new rule of law, it should grant the State 
a fair opportunity to comply with that rule. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in Points A though C of 
this brief, Williams' conviction should be AFFIRMED. As 
explained in Point D, the most relief that Williams might expect 
is an evidentiary remand. Oral argument appears appropriate. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~2°\ day of June, 1995. 
J. KEVIN MURPHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
4In fact, the county prosecutor argued that even under 
Williams' version of the facts, his prosecution on the theft by 
receiving charge, after resolution of the firearm charges, was 
proper (R. 163-64) . And this is not a situation akin to that 
presented in State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894, 903 & n. 10 (Utah 
App. 1993), in which the State's remand request was denied because 
of a prior concession that adverse evidence was accurate. In this 
case, the parties dispute when prosecutors confirmed that the 
pistol was stolen. 
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APPENDIX 
77-1-6 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C-JA — 22 CJ.S. Criminal Law § 21. 
77-1-6. Rights of defendant. 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) Tb appear in person and defend in person or by counsel; 
(b) 7b receive a copy of the accusation filed against him; 
(c) lb testify in his own behalf; 
(d) 7b be confronted by the witnesses against him; 
(e) 7b have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in 
his behalf; 
(f) 7b a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district 
where the offense is alleged to have been committed; 
(g) 7b the right of appeal in all cases; and 
(h) 7b be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be 
entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail 
and if the business of the court permits. 
(2) In addition: 
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense; 
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or 
the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when received; 
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a 
husband against his wife; and 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a 
plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by 
jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by a 
magistrate. 
History: C. 1953, 77*1-5, enacted by L. Husband or wife not competent witness 
19S0, ch. 15,1 2. against or for each other without consent, ex-
Cross-References. — Attorneys, rights in ceptions, § 78*24-8. 
disbarment proceedings, § 78-51-16. Jury trial and waiver thereof, Utah Const, 
Constitutional rights of accused, Utah Art. I, { 10; Rule 17, UJLGrJP. 
Const., Art. I, J 12. lineup procedures, § 77-8-1 et seq. 
Counsel *r indigents, { 77-32-1 et tec.
 M u l t i l e p r 0 8 e c u t i o n B ^ d o u b l e jeopardy, 
Discharge of defendant turned state s wit- • 75.14oi et sea * - * - • » 
^ S s m i l S without trial, Rule 25, U.RCr.P. -j?6**110* v i o l a t i o D c a s e 8 » i e o p B r 6 y **' 8 10" 
Due process of law, Utah Const, Art 1,5 7. '"??• ,
 m . M 
Errors and defects not affecting substantial Subpoena for witnesses for impecunious de-
rights disregarded, Rule 30, U.RCr.R fendant in criminal case, i 21-5-14. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS —testimony at former trial. 
Appearance at trial in prison clothing. - ^ t u n < m y at preliminary bearing. 
W a i v e r of right Copy of accusation. 
Confrontation of witness. — B i n o f particulars. 
—Depositions. Double jeopardy. 
—Right to interpreter. —Retrial proper. 
—Stipulation of testimony. —Separate offenses. 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 AXIL JUT. 2d Criminal Law C.J.S. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law 5 203. 
S 227. Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «» 152. 
76-1-305. Lesser included offense for which period of 
limitations has run. 
Whenever a defendant is charged with an offense for which the period of 
limitations has not run and the defendant should be found guilty of a lesser 
offense for which the period of limitations has run, the finding of the lesser and 
included offense against which the statute of limitations has run shall not be 
a bar to punishment for the lesser offense. 
History: C. 1953, 76-1-305, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, t 76-1-305. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2 d — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law CJS. — 22 C J.S. Criminal Law § 198. 
i 225. Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *» 145V&. 
PART 4 
MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS AND 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
76-1-401. "Single criminal episode" defined — Joinder of 
offenses and defendants. 
In this part unless the context requires a different definition, "single 
criminal episode" means all conduct which is closely related in time and is 
incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective. 
Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit or modify the effect of Section 
77-21-31 in controlling the joinder of offenses and defendants in criminal 
proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 76-1-401, enacted by L. cited in this section, was repealed in 1980. For 
1973, ch. 196, ft 76*1-401; 1975, ch. 47, ft 1. the present comparable provision, see Rule 9, 
Compilers Notes* — Section 77-21-31, R. Crim. R 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Separate episodes. 
Separate episodes. —Criminal objectives. 
—Criminal objectives Where defendant committed a robbery in one 
-Property pawned separately. "J"** md l a * { ; j f a n oJh« r
 k
c ? f i m ^ 8 0 m e S* 
cA^JL>- '<£«.. . tod** awav» Picked up two hitchhikers and 
? i .™! d e d d e d to k i d n a P t h e m ** h ° * * « * . &• differ-
Single episode.
 e n c e -m ^ ^ location, and the criminal objec-
TVaffic offenses. tives of robbery and kidnapping rendered the 
Cited. conduct separate crimes rather than one single 
n 
76-1-402 CRIMINAL CODE 
criminal episode. State v. Ireland, 570 P.2d viduals is a tingle act and a single offense if 
1206 (Utah 1977). evidence shows that the items were retained 
The unlawful taking of a vehicle and the simultaneously. Therefore, where stolen items 
failure to stop at the command of a police officer were the subject of a previous prosecution for 
were two separate offenses, and not a single related offenses, a second prosecution was pre-
episode, because the two offenses occurred a eluded. State v. Bair, 671 R2d 203 (Utah 1983). 
day apart and the criminal objective in the 
unlawful taking was to obtain possession while Traffic offenses. 
the criminal objective in the failure to stop was x ^
 Btctioti d o c f n o t preVent the prosecution 
to avoid arrest for a traffic violation. State v.
 o f t ^ n i n ; driving charge under { 41-6-44 after 
Cornish, 671 P.2d 677 (Utah 1977). ^ defendant has pleaded guilty to driving 
—Property pawned separately. without a license, without a registration certifi-
Receipt of property stolen, received, and «** **d without a safety sticker, since the 
pawned on three different day* did not arise citations charge separate offenses entirely un-
out of a single criminal episode. State v. Tarafa, related to each other. Hupp v. Johnson, 606 R2d 
720 R2d 1368 (Utah 1986). 253 (Utah 1980). 
Separate offenses. Cited in State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896 (Utah 
Although defendants crimes were committed 1986); State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 (Utah Ct 
during a single criminal episode, he committed App. 1987); State v. McGrath, 749 P.2d 631 
two separate burglaries by breaking into two (Utah 1988); State v. Thompson, 751 P.2d 805 
separate, locked portions of an apartment (Utah Ct. App. 1986); State v. Ortega, 751 P.2d 
building. State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1138 (Utah 1988); State v. Johnson, 784 R2d 
1985). 1135 (Utah 1989); State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39 
*,
 - t , . (Utah Ct App. 1990). 
Single episode. r r 
Retention of stolen property of different indi-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d-—21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law C-J.S. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law { 14. 
( 20. Key Numbers. — Criminal Law •» 29. 
76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal 
episode — Included offenses. 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all 
separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the 
same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses 
which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this 
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or 
conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under 
any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single 
criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a 
defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the 
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment. 
(S) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense 
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included 
offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of prepa-
ration to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included 
therein; or 
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(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an 
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate 
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence 
to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient 
evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact 
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense, 
the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a 
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a 
new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant. 
History: C. 1953, 76-1-402, enacted by L. another statute, } 76-6-704. 
1973, ch. 196, ft 76-1-402; 1974, ch. 32, ft 2. Double jeopardy prohibited for same offense, 
Cross-References. —Computer Crimes Act Utah Const., Art I, Sec. 12; U.S. Const, 
not to bar prosecution for conduct also violating Amend. V; ft 77-1-6. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
•Act" 
Instructions. 
Jurisdiction of appellate court 
—Judgment entered for included offense. 
Jurisdiction of a single court 
Lesser included offense. 
—Aggravated assault. 
—Aggravated robbery. 
—Joy riding. 
—Manslaughter. 
—Negligent homicide. 
—Possession of stolen vehicle. 
—Theft. 
Misdemeanor and felony charges. 
Multiple predicate offenses. 
Separate offenses. 
—Attempted homicide. 
—Automobile violations. 
—Burglary and larceny. 
—Burglary ano/theft 
—Felony murder. 
—Forcible sexual abuse. 
—Negligent homicide. 
—Theft 
Cited. 
"Act* 
"Act" as used in Subsection (1) includes not 
only volitional acts of a defendant but also the 
number of victims, as each is acted upon by a 
defendant State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61 (Utah C t 
App. 1989); State v. Gambrell, 814 P.2d 1136 
(Utah Ct App. 1991). 
Instructions. 
Where the greater offense includes all the 
elements of the lesser offense, an instruction on 
the lesser offense may be refused if the pros-
ecution has met its burden of proof on the 
elements of the greater offense and there is no 
evidence tending to reduce the greater offense; 
however, if there be any evidence, however 
slight on any reasonable theory of the case 
under which defendant might be convicted of 
the lesser included offense, the trial court must, 
if requested, give an appropriate instruction on 
the lesser included offense. State v. Chesnut, 
621 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980). 
Trial court may give a lesser included offense 
instruction, even over a defendant's objection, if 
warranted by the evidence and if there is 
clearly no risk that the defendant will be preju-
diced by lack of notice and preparation so as to 
deprive him of a full and fair opportunity to 
defend himself. State v. Howell, 649 R2d 91 
(Utah 1982). 
Although lesser offense must be necessarily 
included within charged offense in order to 
warrant prosecutor's request for lesser in-
cluded offense instructions, a "rational basis* 
test is all that is required when instruction is at 
request of defense. State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 
(Utah 1983). 
In a burglary case, it was not prejudicial 
error for a trial court to refuse to give instruc-
tions on criminal trespass as a lesser included 
offense, when the evidence supported only the 
burglary charge. State v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 215 
(Utah 1983). 
Defendants in a prosecution for second de-
gree murder, who maintained that they did not 
cause the victim's death, were not entitled to a 
lesser included offense instruction on man-
slaughter since their defense would also have 
required acquittal of manslaughter. State v. 
Crick, 675 P.2d 527 (Utah 1983). 
A lesser included offense shares not only 
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PART 4 
LIMITATIONS AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS ON 
SENTENCES 
76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences — Limita-
tions. 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more 
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences 
for the offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently unless the 
court states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively. 
(2) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and 
the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining 
whether to impose consecutive sentences. 
(3) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a 
single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(4) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all 
sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment. However, this 
limitation does not apply if an offense for which the defendant is sentenced 
authorizes the death penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. 
(5) The limitation in Subsection (4) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which 
were committed prior to imposition of sentence for any one or more of 
them; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the 
present sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal 
jurisdiction. 
(6) In determining the effect of consecutive sentences and the manner in 
which they shall be served, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall treat the 
defendant as though he has been committed for a single term that shall consist 
of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation the 
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum 
term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum 
terms. 
(7) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concur-
rently with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the lesser 
sentence shall merge into the greater and the greater shall be the term to be 
served. If the sentences are equal and concurrent, they shall merge into one 
sentence with the most recent conviction constituting the time to be served. 
(8) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of 
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity 
of any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually 
served under the commitments. 
(9) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to 
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
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History: C. 1953, 76-S-401, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-401; 1974, ch. 32, ft 7; 
1989, ch. 181, { 1; 1994, ch. 13, ft 21. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
ment, effective May 2, 1994, substituted "30 
ANALYSIS 
Commencement of second sentence. 
Concurrent sentences. 
Consecutive sentences. 
Mitigating circumstances. 
Sentences imposed by different states. 
Commencement of second sentence. 
Sentence upon conviction of second offense 
could not begin later than termination of first; 
court properly sentenced defendant to serve 
additional five years on conviction of perjury, to 
commence upon expiration of life sentence 
which defendant was already serving. State v. 
Dodge, 19 Utah 2d 44, 425 R2d 781 (1967). 
Concurrent sentences. 
When the trial court declined to determine 
whether defendant's sentences would run con-
currently or consecutively and, instead, left 
•that decision to the Division of Corrections* 
the trial court's delegation to the Department of 
Corrections of the responsibilities given to it 
under this section was inappropriate, but the 
error was harmless in light of the express 
language of the statute, providing that the 
sentences run concurrently. State v. Hallett, 
796 P.2d 701 (Utah Ct App. 1990), aflTd, 856 
P.2d 1060 (Utah 1993). 
Consecutive sentences. 
The court did not err in imposing consecutive 
sentences on the defendant for the crimes of 
aggravated kidnapping and sexual assault, 
even though both were committed in the course 
of a single criminal episode, where the evidence 
clearly showed that a sufficiently substantial 
period of time had elapsed, both before and 
after the sexual assault, in which the victim 
was restrained against her will and subjected 
to a substantial risk of harm. State v. Jolivet, 
712 P.2d 843 (Utah 1986); State v. Stettina, 868 
R2d 108 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Trial court did not err in imposing four con-
secutive sentences for second-degree murder, 
attempted murder and two counts of aggra-
vated assault arising out of a barroom alterca-
tion, because defendant committed four sepa-
rate and distinct crimes involving different 
victims. State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61 (Ct. App. 
1989). 
This section does not preclude the imposition 
of consecutive sentences, but merely restricts 
years imprisonment" for *30 years' imprison-
ment" in Subsection (4) and substituted "Board 
of Pardons and Parole" for 'Board of Pardons" 
in Subsection (6). 
the effect of consecutive sentences. State v. 
Swapp, 808 R2d 115 (Utah Ct App.), cert, 
denied, 815 P2d 241 (Utah 1991). 
The purpose of a statute limiting consecutive 
sentences is to guard against oppressive and 
inequitably long sentences. State v. Swapp, 808 
P.2d 115 (Utah Ct App.), cert denied, 815 P.2d 
241 (Utah 1991). 
- This section does not preclude the imposition 
of consecutive sentences that total more than 
thirty years, but restricts the actual time 
served to a maximum of thirty years. State v. 
Horton, 848 P.2d 708 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, 
denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993); State v. 
Stettina, 868 P.2d 108 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
This section does not prohibit the imposition 
of consecutive sentences not carrying a maxi-
mum of life in prison from exceeding thirty 
years. State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431 (Utah 1993). 
Although the first portion of Subsection (4) 
limits the aggregate maximum of consecutive 
sentences to thirty years' imprisonment, when 
read in conjunction with the second portion, 
this limitation does not apply if any of the 
sentences imposed that are part of the consecu-
tive sentence chain authorizes the death pen-
alty or life imprisonment. When seven of nine 
offenses authorized life imprisonment, Subsec-
tion (4) did not apply. State v. Deli, 861 R2d 431 
CUtah 1993). 
Mitigating circumstances. 
In sentencing 16-year-old defendant who 
pled guilty to first degree murder, child kidnap-
ping, and aggravated sexual abuse of a child to 
consecutive sentences, trial court abused its 
discretion in failing to consider the defendant's 
rehabilitative needs in light of his extreme 
youth and the absence of prior violent crimes. 
State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993). 
Only young age — not old age — may be a 
mitigating factor. State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454 
(Utah Ct App. 1993). 
Sentences imposed by different states. 
Subsection (1), providing that sentences are 
to run concurrently unless the court states to 
Ihe contrary in the sentence, does not apply to 
sentences imposed by two different sovereigns, 
and, therefore, such sentences should run con-
secutively unless the sentencing court ex-
pressly directs otherwise. State v. Reed, 709 
R2d 391 (Utah 1985). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 1993, designated as 
"(a)" and rewrote the existing provisions, delet-
ing "other than an infraction" after "offense," 
and added Subdivisions (b) to (e). 
Cro88*References. — Counsel for indigent 
defendants, § 77-32-1 et seq. 
Defense costs in criminal actions, convicted 
defendants may be ordered to pay, § 77-32a-l 
et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Determination of indigency. 
—Appeal. 
Self-representation. 
Determination of indigency. 
—Appeal. 
The determination of indigency is a question 
of fact to be determined by the trial court; once 
that determination has been made, it is enti-
tled to the same presumptions of correctness as 
other trial court findings and determinations; 
therefore, the person attacking that rinding 
has the burden to prove it is in error. Webster 
v. Jones, 587 P.2d 528 (Utah 1978). 
Self-representation. 
Because the exercise of the right to defend 
oneself in a criminal prosecution necessarily 
constitutes a waiver of the important right to 
professional counsel, trial courts have an affir-
mative duty to determine that a defendant who 
chooses self-representation does so knowingly 
and intelligently. State v. Drbbel, 815 P.2d 724 
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 
(Utah 1991). 
Trial court did not err in allowing defendant 
to represent himself, after the court properly 
inquired into defendant's wish to represent 
himself, and properly took defendant's ques-
tionable mental health into account in consid-
ering the request. State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724 
(Utah Ct. App.), cert denied, 836 P.2d 1383 
(Utah 1991). 
The choice to represent oneself does not auto-
matically give defendant access to research re-
sources enjoyed by professional counsel. State 
v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, 
denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1991). 
A foreign-national defendant had a constitu-
tional right to defend himself if he chose to do 
BO, notwithstanding his limited understanding 
of English and of the U.S. judicial system; the 
trial court deprived him of that right when it 
applied an incorrect legal standard, consider-
ing the defendant's best interests and his tech-
nical ability to manage his own defense. More-
over, because the court's determination that 
the defendant could not knowingly and intelli-
gently choose self-representation was not sup-
ported either by the facts or by any meaningful 
inquiry into the defendant's ability to under-
stand the risks of self-representation, the case 
was remanded to allow defendant to represent 
himself. State v. Bakalov, 849 P.2d 629 (Utah 
Ct App. 1993). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Judicial Jabber-
wocky or Uniform Constitutional Protection? 
Strickland v. Washington and National Stan-
dards for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Claims, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 723. 
A.L.R. — Relief available for violation of 
right to counsel at sentencing in state criminal 
trial, 65 A.L.R.4th 183. 
Rule 9. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1990, ch. 201, § 2 re-
pealed former I 77-35-9, and thus this rule, 
effective April 23, 1990. For present compara-
ble provisions, see i 77-8a-l. See also State v. 
Ineffective assistance of counsel: misrepre-
sentation, or failure to advise, of immigration 
consequences of guilty plea —- state cases, 65 
A.LJUth 719. 
What constitutes assertion of right to coun-
sel following Miranda warnings — federal 
cases, 80 A.L.R. Fed. 622. 
Lee, 831 P.2d 114 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 
843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992) (applying I 77-8a-l 
instead of this rule, finding that the repeal of 
the statute operated to repeal the rule). 
Rule 9.5. Charged multiple offenses — To be filed in single 
court 
(1) (a) Unless otherwise provided by law, complaints, citations, or informa-
tions charging multiple offenses, which may include violations of state 
laws, county ordinances, or municipal ordinances and arising from a sin-
gle criminal episode as defined by Section 76-1-401, shall be filed in a 
single court that has jurisdiction of the charged offense with the highest 
possible penalty of all the offenses charged. 
(b) The offenses within the complaint, citation, or information may not 
be separated except by order of the court and for good cause shown. 
(2) For purposes of this section, the court that is abjudicating the com-
plaint, citation, or information has jurisdiction over all the offenses charged, 
and a single prosecutorial entity shall prosecute the offenses. 
